A lawsuit does not always get one judge. Often, judges transfer in and out of a case over its lifespan. Judges retire. Judges take leave and need coverage. With every change in the guard, a new set of perspectives, understandings, judicial beliefs, and experiences comes too. Sometimes, an incoming judge disagrees entirely with how the predecessor judge has handled the case. This article addresses the rules governing incoming judges who do not see eye to eye with their predecessor judge. If you have questions or concerns about a successor judge reversing, rehearing, or reconsidering a predecessor judge’s orders, please contact Bernhard Law Firm at www.bernhardlawfirm.com, 786-871-3349, abernhard@bernhardlawfirm.com.

Florida Law Against the Successor Judge Overturning the Predecessor Judge in the Same Case

Under well-founded Florida law, when a case is transferred from one judge to another, the successor judge must respect and cannot overrule the decisions and orders of the former judge. Haliburton v. Singletary, 691 So. 2d 466, 469 (Fla. 1997) (holding successor judge must affirm predecessor judge’s order by denying a motion for rehearing that reargues points and facts already considered); Jauregui v. Bob’s Piano Sales & Serv., Inc., 922 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“it is quite obvious that the successor judge lacked the power or authority to revisit, much less reverse, the previous decision on the merits); State, Dep’t of Rev., Child Support Enf. v. Riley, 684 So. 2d 905, 905 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (quoting Pantoja v. Reliable Trucking, Inc., 585 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) that “[t]he law is clear that the intracircuit transferring of cases from one judge to another, whether within a designated division or different divisions, is a matter of internal administration of the court and does not affect the validity of orders or judgments rendered.”); Hewlett v. State, 661 So. 2d 112, 115 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (“one circuit judge cannot reverse the prior order of another circuit court judge.”).

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The Rule Against Successor Judge Reversals Is Ubiquitous

This general rule is regularly enforced across Florida and elsewhere, in both state and federal court, in numerous circumstances and various postures. Id.; Boeing Co. v. Merchant, 397 So. 2d 399, 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (“A petition for rehearing which merely presents the same matters to a subsequent judge will not allow modification of the original order.”); Berrien v. State, 189 So. 3d 285, 286–87 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (as a general rule, a successor judge may not correct errors of law committed by his predecessor in ruling on injunction, and hence he cannot review and reverse on the merits and on the same facts as his predecessor); Booth v. Booth, 91 So. 3d 272, 274 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (holding successor judge was not entitled to vacate order denying motion for fees in absence of any evidence of special circumstances, as “the party will not be entitled to a second bite of the apple at a second [] hearing”); Balva v. Ontario Wealth Mgmt. Corp., 241 So. 3d 869, 870 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (successor judge may not correct errors of law committed by his predecessor and hence he cannot review and reverse on the merits and on the same facts, for definitive rulings such as entitlement to fees); Drdek v. Drdek, 79 So. 3d 216, 219 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (holding circuit court judge could not overrule the decision of a prior circuit court judge in non-final order on alimony).

For more case law, see also Barfield v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2017 WL 662012, at *6 n.3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2017) (refusing to grant motion to reconsider prior judge’s decision on summary judgment, under this general rule); In re Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. Erisa Litigation, 2007 WL 1877887, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 28, 2007) (quoting Global Access Ltd. v. AT & T Corp., 987 F. Supp. 1459, 1461 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (“overturning the ruling of a predecessor judge is an exceptional step, not to be taken lightly.”); Stevenson v. Four Winds Travel, Inc., 462 F.2d 899, 904–05 (5th Cir. 1972) (“The rule in most of the national courts [] is that where a judge [] renders a decision and makes a judicial order in such case, and thereafter the case is transferred to the calendar of another judge [], the latter judge should respect and not overrule such decision and order.”); Lawyers Co-op. Pub. Co. v. Williams, 149 Fla. 390, 392 (Fla. 1942) (“A successor judge generally cannot review, modify or reverse, upon the merits, on the same facts, the final orders of his predecessors unless there exists some special circumstances such as mistake or fraud perpetrated on the court.”); Groover v. Walker, 88 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 1956) (“The Court is committed to the general proposition that a successor judge may not correct errors of law committed by his predecessor and he cannot review and reverse on the merits and on the same facts the final orders and decrees of his predecessor.”). Although there are some limited exceptions to this rule, those only occur if the rule is carried to its extreme to dictate absurd results.

The Rule Against Successor Judge Reversals Is Necessary for the Public’s Faith in the Judicial System, a Man-Made System Run by Lawyers

This rule is necessary to promote stability of decisions, to ensure speedy conclusion of litigation, to properly allocate appellate powers and ensure reasonable administration of the law, to help judges stop themselves from exceeding their authority, and to avoid unseemly contests and differences that shake our public’s confidence and trust in our judicial system:

“Such limits are necessary to promote stability of decisions and to avoid unseemly contests and differences. [State v. Gary, 609 So. 2d 1291, 1293 (Fla. 1992)]. Thus, in the instant case, the chief judge exceeded his authority by vacating a colleague’s order in an appellate fashion.”

Hewlett v. State, 661 So. 2d at 115 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (“one circuit judge cannot reverse the prior order of another circuit court judge.”) (emphasis added); see also Groover, 88 So. 2d at 313 (even where rehearings or reconsiderations may be technically authorized and within the trial court’s inherent authority, in these circumstances “an appeal should be taken rather than application made to another circuit judge.”).

As stated by United States Circuit Judge Walter H. Sandborn, to allow anything else “would be intolerable”:

“The rule itself, and a careful observance of it, are essential to the prevention of unseemly conflicts, to the speedy conclusion of litigation, and to the reasonable administration of the law, especially in the national courts, where many judges are qualified to sit at the trials, and are frequently called upon to act in the same cases. It is unavoidable that the opinions of several judges upon the many doubtful questions which are constantly arising should sometimes differ, and a rule of practice which would permit one judge to sustain a demurrer to a complaint, another of co-ordinate jurisdiction to overrule it and to try the case upon the theory that the pleading was sufficient, and the former to then arrest the judgment, upon the ground that his decision upon the demurrer was right, would be intolerable. It has long been almost universally observed.”

Stevenson v. Four Winds Travel, Inc., 462 F.2d 899, 905 (5th Cir. 1972) (quoting Plattner Implement Co. v. Int’l Harvester Co., 133 F. 376, 378–79 (8th Cir. 1904)).

In observing this rule to deny a motion for reconsideration of an order granting partial summary judgment, the Southern District of Florida confirmed:

“The policy underlying this rule is self-evident. Chief Judge Hatchett best expressed it by stating: ‘[w]hen the outcome of a case changes simply because the membership of a court changes, the public’s respect for the legal system is eroded.’ Harris v. Luckey, 918 F.2d 888, 894 (11th Cir. 1990).”

Global Access, 987 F. Supp. at 1461 (emphasis added).

In similar circumstances, the Florida Supreme Court has echoed these same policies:

“[T]he interests of justice require a rule designed to inhibit trial courts from engaging in a “ping-pong game” by transferring a case back and forth, thereby jeopardizing the rights of the parties and undermining public confidence in the public function. [citations omitted]. Accordingly, we conclude that absent extraordinary circumstances, a trial judge’s order . . . may not be reviewed by a successor trial judge . . . Once such an order has been issue, it must be honored . . . unless and until a proper appellate court rules otherwise.

[The successor trial judge’s] order was inappropriate because it amounted to appellate review of the legality of [the former trial judge’s] Order. . . . [The second trial judge] reviewed [the former trial judge’s] Order even though [the second trial judge] had no appellate jurisdiction in this matter and no appeal had been taken. Under the circumstances presented here, it would have been up to an appellate court upon proper review to determine if the [] Order was issued without legal authority.

Hence, we issue the writ and quash [the second judge’s] order.”

State v. Gary, 609 So. 2d 1291, 1294 (Fla. 1992) (despite opining on an order of change of venue, the policy holds the same).

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But What About the Incoming Judge’s Inherent Authority Over Orders in Its Case?

Under this rule, the trial court cannot exercise its technical inherent authority over the orders on its docket to reverse his predecessor’s orders, rulings, and decisions where the facts remain unchanged. Lawyers Co-op., 149 Fla. at 393 (Fla. 1942) (holding even though the trial court’s order is technically under its own control during the term at which the order was rendered, it does not follow from this recognition of the court’s inherent power and authority over its own actions that a successor judge may reverse or modify his predecessor’s orders or discretionary rulings where the facts remain unchanged); State ex rel. Wesley Const. Co. v. O’Connell, 347 So. 2d 442, 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (“a successor judge or substitute judge may not overrule a predecessor’s action in the cause”); Groover at 313 (where predecessor judge enter summary judgment, it was error for successor judge on unchanged facts to enter an order vacating the summary judgment of the predecessor judge); O’Neal v. Darling, 321 So. 3d 309, 312–13 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (“A successor judge cannot review, modify or reverse, upon the merits on the same facts, the final orders of his predecessor in the absence of fraud or mistake.”).

This rule applies to motions for rehearing, reconsideration, and motions to vacate or for other post-judgment relief. Lawyers Co-op at 393 (holding trial court prohibited from reversing predecessor judge, whether through motion for rehearing or motion to vacate).

Other Legal Doctrine Supporting the Rule Against Successor Judge Reversals

This rule is supported by the rule of comity, constitutional requirements for due process, and the statutory and constitutional allocation of appellate powers. Herron v. Passailaigue, 92 Fla. 818, 836 (Fla. 1926) (a court may not depart from rules of comity, and should thereby enforce other judge’s orders); Carriers Ins. Co. v. LeRoy, 309 So. 2d 35, 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (enforcing other judge’s order on comity); State v. Bullock, 50 So. 418, 418–19 (Fla. 1909) (under the Constitution, circuit courts had only appellate jurisdiction in cases appealed from the county courts, and could not exercise appellate review otherwise); § 26.012, Fla. Stat. (2022) (Circuit Court jurisdiction); see also Pleasures II Adult Video, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 833 So. 2d 185, 188–89 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (the Florida Constitution prohibits the Circuit Court from sitting in an appellate capacity apart from the provisions of the Florida Statutes); Wovas v. Tousa Homes, Inc., 940 So. 2d 1166, 1167–68 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (holding circuit court did not have appellate jurisdiction over HOA oversight agency decisions); State v. Craycraft, 817 So. 2d 864, 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (finding that lack of notice of appeal to circuit court was not determinative as to whether circuit court was properly acting in its appellate capacity, and whether such appellate review was within its jurisdiction).

Relief Comes from the Appeals Court Through Petition for Mandamus or Certiorari Writs

Where a successor judge ignores this rule and reverses a predecessor judge’s order after intracircuit transfer, the affected party is entitled to a Writ of Mandamus or other extraordinary relief quashing the successor judge’s order. Gary, 609 So. 2d at 1294 (Fla. 1992) (granting petitioner for writ of mandamus or other extraordinary relief to quash successor judge’s order).

Final Notions Generally on the Burden to Reconsider a Ruling

Lastly, even where a motion for reconsideration is properly subject to ruling by the trial court, if the legal questions are “at least arguable,” then the necessary “clear and obvious” error does not exist for reconsideration. Global Access at 1461 (quoting Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Glenn Estess & Assoc., Inc., 763 F.2d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 1985) and citing Villareal v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 545 F.2d 978, 979 (5th Cir. 1977) (“a mere difference of opinion between judges is not ‘tantamount to the ‘clear’ mistake of law necessary’ for reconsideration”); Z.K. Marine, Inc. v. M/V Archigetis, 808 F. Supp. 1561, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (“reconsideration is only appropriate ‘to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.’”).

Conclusion

A lawsuit does not always get one judge. This is a normal reflection that our judges are people and our courts are not stagnant. Fortunately, we have guidance in place to facilitate transfers, transitions, and coverage between predecessor and successor judges in the same case. This is crucial when an incoming judge disagrees entirely with how the predecessor judge has handled the case. This article generally addressed the rules governing incoming judges who do not see eye to eye with their predecessor judge. If you have additional questions or concerns about a successor judge reversing, rehearing, or reconsidering a predecessor judge’s orders, please contact Bernhard Law Firm at www.bernhardlawfirm.com, 786-871-3349, abernhard@bernhardlawfirm.com.